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Abstract 
 
In the television show Deal or No Deal a contestant is endowed with a sealed box 
containing a monetary prize between one cent and half a million euros. In the course of 
the show the contestant is offered to exchange her box for another sealed box with the 
same distribution of possible monetary prizes inside. This offers a unique natural 
experiment for studying endowment effects under high monetary incentives. We find 
only weak endowment effects when contestants exchange their box for another box with 
the same distribution of possible prizes. 
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Endowment Effects?  
“Even” with Half a Million on the Table! 
1. Introduction 
Substantial experimental evidence from economics and psychology suggests that 
initial endowments have an impact on human preferences. Endowment effect (Thaler 
(1980)) says that when people come to own a good, they tend to value it more than they 
did before they owned it (Kahneman et al. (1991)). For example, Kahneman et al. (1990) 
find that students, who were given mugs worth $6 each, were willing to sell them at a 
median price of $7 each. At the same time, students, who did not come to possess the 
mugs, were willing to buy them at a median price of $3.50 per mug. While many 
experiments replicate this result, several studies treat the endowment effect as an 
inexperienced consumer’s mistake, which disappears in the process of learning (e.g. Knez 
et al. (1985), Coursey et al. (1987), Brookshire and Coursey (1987), Shogren et al. (1994).  
In a field experiment, List (2004) finds that professional dealers on the sports card 
market are more likely to accept the swap offer than inexperienced consumers. List 
(2004) argues that consumers facing decision problem, which they have experienced 
before, may overcome the endowment effect. In a similar vein, Myagkov and Plott (1997) 
find that risk-seeking behavior over losses, predicted by prospect theory, tends to 
decrease with experience in a market setting. Plott and Zeiler (2007) show that 
asymmetries in exchange behavior disappear if an experimenter controls for subject 
misconceptions by introducing incentive-compatible elicitation device, subject training in 
the task, paid practice rounds and subject anonymity. This paper contributes to this 
literature by showing that individuals exhibit only weak endowment effects if they make 
decisions involving high stakes, even without prior practice or training and when their 
decisions are broadcasted on television. 
  3
We use the natural experiment of the television show Deal or No Deal to analyze 
endowment effects when stakes are large. Deal or No Deal is produced by the media 
company Endemol in 44 countries worldwide. In this paper we analyze French, Italian 
and British versions of the show. Deal or No Deal contestants are endowed with a sealed 
box, containing an unknown monetary prize. The maximum prize is €500,000 in France 
and Italy and £250,000 in the UK.  
During the show, contestants have a possibility to exchange their box for another 
box with the same distribution of possible prizes inside.1 This provides a unique natural 
experiment to test endowment effects in a previously unexplored domain – when lotteries 
involve large outcomes. The importance of large stakes is apparent in Blavatskyy and 
Pogrebna (2008) who find that, in contrast to numerous laboratory studies with low 
monetary incentives, British and Italian Deal or No Deal contestants do not exhibit lower 
risk aversion when facing gains of low probability. 
We find that in all three versions of the show, Deal or No Deal contestants exhibit 
only weak endowment effects. The swap offer is accepted by 73%, 47% and 43% of 
contestants who receive exchange offers in the French, Italian and British version of the 
show respectively. This finding suggests that people may overcome endowment effects 
under high monetary incentives. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes television 
show Deal or No Deal. Data are presented in Section 3. Section 4 derives the theoretical 
predictions of expected utility, regret and prospect theory. Section 5 presents our main 
empirical findings. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
1 In addition to exchange offers, contestants also receive monetary offers for selling the content of their box. 
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2. Description of the Television Show 
French, Italian and British versions of the Deal or No Deal television show have 
the following common features. Several contestants, each representing one of the 
administrative regions of the country, participate in every television episode. All 
contestants self-select into the show by submitting an application for participation either 
through the national Deal or No Deal web site or by calling the selection center in their 
country. 
Contestants are randomly assigned identical sealed boxes, numbered 
consecutively from the first to the last. Boxes contain monetary prizes, ranging from very 
small to very large. Monetary prizes are allocated across boxes by the independent notary 
company. Contestants know the list of possible prizes at any point in the show but they 
do not know the content of each box. 
The show consists of two stages. During the first (preliminary) stage, one 
contestant is selected to play the game. Remaining contestants (waiting contestants) 
continue to participate in the next television episode. The contestant, selected to play the 
game, is replaced by a new representative of the same region. New contestant is selected 
from a pool of volunteers who applied for the participation. 
The second stage is the game itself. During the game, a contestant keeps her own 
box and opens the remaining boxes one by one. When a box is opened, the prize hidden 
inside is publicly revealed and eliminated from the list of possible prizes.  
After opening several boxes a contestant receives an offer from the “bank”. The 
offer could be either a monetary price for the content of her box or the possibility to 
exchange her box for any of the remaining sealed boxes. If a contestant is offered to swap 
her box, she can pick any box from sealed boxes that are left in the game (the new box is 
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not selected by the producers, the audience or other contestants). In this paper we analyze 
contestants’ decisions whether to accept or reject the exchange offer.  
The game terminates when either the contestant accepts the price offered by the 
“bank” or when all boxes are opened. In the latter case, the contestant leaves with the 
content of her box, which is opened last. The game does not terminate when the 
contestant accepts (or rejects) the exchange offer. Irrespective of the contestant’s decision 
on the exchange offer, she must continue opening remaining sealed boxes one by one 
until the “bank” makes another offer or all boxes are opened. 
2.1. French Version 
À Prendre ou à Laisser is the French version of Deal or No Deal. It is aired every 
weeknight on the channel TF1 of the French television. The show features 22 contestants 
from 22 different regions of France, holding identical boxes. Each box contains a 
randomly assigned monetary prize, ranging from €0.01 to €500,000.2 The list of possible 
prizes is given on Figure 1. For entertainment purposes, three low monetary prizes are 
substituted by token gifts (e.g. a cup for €5 or a puppy for €100). Boxes are assigned to 
the contestants by an independent adjudicator, who is present in the studio during the 
show. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
During the preliminary stage, contestants receive one general knowledge selection 
question with three possible answers (A, B and C). One of contestants, who answered this 
question correctly, is selected to play the game. However, the criteria for the selection 
procedure (e.g. “fastest finger”, random selection, longest waiting time on the show) are 
not revealed to the public.  
                                                 
2 In 2007 the number of contestants was increased to 24 and the top prize was raised to €1,000,000. 
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In the French version of Deal or No Deal one of the prizes is a “Joker” - an 
episode-specific variable. The “Joker” is determined in the beginning of the show by 
multiplying the number of correct answers to the selection question, given by contestants 
in the preliminary stage, by €10,000. The amount of the “Joker” is instantaneously added 
to the list of possible prizes.3  
In the French version of the show contestants receive offers from the “bank” after 
opening 6, 3, 3, 3, 3 and 2 boxes respectively. Another peculiarity of this version is that 
the exchange offers are fairly frequent (up to four exchange offers per episode). However, 
there is no requirement for the “bank” to make any exchange offers to the contestant 
during a television episode.  
2.2. Italian Version 
Affari Tuoi is a daily television show, broadcasted on the first channel of Italian 
television RAI Uno. Twenty contestants participate in every episode. Every contestant is 
randomly assigned one box that contains one of twenty monetary prizes ranging from 
€0.01 to €500,000 (Figure 2). Four low prizes are substituted with the token gifts. Similar 
to the French version, independent notary company assigns boxes to contestants. Before 
February 11, 2006, contestants received offers from the “bank” after opening 6, 3, 3, 3 
and 3 boxes correspondingly. Starting from February 11, 2006, the “bank” makes offers 
after a contestant opens 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 1, and 1 box respectively. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
In every episode, the contestant receives at least one offer to exchange her box. 
Official rules of the show require the “bank” to offer exchange option at least once in 
                                                 
3 In our example, 22 contestants have answered the selection question correctly. Therefore, the amount of 
the “Joker” displayed on Figure 1 is €220, 000. 
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every television episode. Therefore, the first offer that the “bank” makes to the contestant 
is always the exchange offer.4 Since the “bank” always proposes exchange in the first 
offer, irrespective of the distribution of the remaining prizes or the personality of the 
contestant, the first exchange offer is always uninformative i.e. it does not provide any 
information about possible content of the contestant’s box.5 
Occasionally (in 28% of all episodes in our sample), the contestant also receives 
the second offer to exchange her box. The “bank” typically offers the second exchange 
opportunity when there are only two sealed boxes left (including the box in the possession 
of the contestant).6 The second exchange offer is made at the discretion of the “bank” 
(official rules of the show do not regulate when the “bank” should offer second exchange 
possibility). However, in our recorded sample the “bank” offers the second exchange 
option almost equally frequently when the prize inside the contestant’s box is above and 
below the median of the distribution of possible prizes. Thus, the second exchange offer 
is uninformative i.e. contestants cannot infer new information about the prize hidden 
inside their box upon observing the second exchange offer.  
2.3. British Version 
Deal or No Deal UK is aired on Channel 4 of the British television. Twenty two 
contestants from different parts of the UK participate in every episode.7 The prizes range 
                                                 
4 Before February 11, 2006, the first offer was always made after the contestant opened six boxes. Starting 
from February 11, 2006, the first offer was made after the contestant opened three boxes. 
5 According to Bombardini and Trebbi (2005), the “bank” in the Italian version of Deal or No Deal is 
informed about the prize sealed inside the contestant’s box and can potentially make informative offers. 
6 Such offers constitute 71% of all cases when the “bank” proposes the second exchange opportunity. In 
18% (7%) of the cases the second exchange offer is made when five (eight) unopened boxes are left. In one 
episode exchange is offered when four unopened boxes are left. 
7 Except for the British contestants, contestants from India, Italy and the United States appeared on the 
show. In contrast to the French and Italian version, in the British version regional diversity is not strictly 
observed, i.e. several representatives of the same administrative region may appear on the show at one time.  
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from £0.01 to £250,000 (Figure 3).8 They are randomly assigned to 22 boxes by an 
independent adjudicator. However, an independent adjudicator does not assign boxes to 
contestants. After the prizes are distributed across boxes and boxes are sealed, contestants 
choose their boxes at random by drawing numbered ping-pong balls.  
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
The British version of the show does not have a selection phase. The contestant is 
pre-selected by the producers and, therefore, it is quite rare for contestants to wait for 
more than 30 shows before they receive an opportunity to play the game. However, 
waiting contestants do not know in advance when they will be selected. 
The game itself follows a similar procedure as in France and Italy: contestants 
receive offers after opening 5, 3, 3, 3, 3, and 3 boxes respectively. However, there are 
three major differences. First, the contestants in Deal or No Deal UK rarely receive 
exchange offers. As a rule, the “bank” offers to exchange the box when there are only 
two unopened boxed left and the contestant rejects the last monetary offer.9  
Second, in Deal or No Deal UK the contestant may take advice from waiting 
contestants or suggestions from the host on the next box to be opened or on whether to 
accept or reject the deal from the “bank”. This is very different from the procedure in 
France and Italy, where it is observed by the representative of the independent notary 
company, present on the show, that contestant’s decision to open a certain box or to 
accept or reject the monetary offer of the “bank” is not precipitated by the suggestions of 
waiting contestants or the host. Moreover, while in Deal or No Deal UK the contestant is 
allowed to change her mind about opening a certain box after she has already called out 
its number, in France and Italy contestants do not have this opportunity. 
                                                 
8 At the time of the broadcasts the exchange rate was £1= €1.48. 
9 Such offers constitute 78% of all exchange offers in our Deal or No Deal UK data set. In 21% of all cases 
the first offer is the exchange offer. In one episode exchange is offered when eight unopened boxes are left. 
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3. Data 
The data set, analyzed in this paper, consists of 49 television episodes of the 
French version, 100 episodes of the Italian version and 355 episodes of the British 
version of Deal or No Deal. Only one contestant plays the game in every episode. French 
episodes have been broadcasted from January 3rd, 2006 till April 10th, 2006 on channel 
TF1.10 Italian episodes have been aired from September 20th, 2005 to February 13th, 2006 
on channel RAI Uno.11 British episodes have been broadcasted from October 31st, 2005 
to January 12th, 2007 on Channel 4 of the British television.12 Table 1 summarizes 
selected descriptive statistics for French, Italian and British contestants in our data set. 
Descriptive Statistics French version Italian version British version 
Percent of female 71% 55% 50% 
Average age (years) 28 47 41 
Percent of married 39% 81% 51% 
Average earnings €71,579 €30,363 £16,763 
Median earnings €50,000 €20,000 £12,900 
Average number of exchange 
offers per contestant 1.86 1.29 0.18 
Table 1 Selected descriptive statistics for French, Italian and British contestants 
Deal or No Deal regulations state that prizes are allocated across boxes at random. 
We checked if prizes are equally likely to appear inside each box. In our data set the 
distribution of prizes across boxes is not significantly different from a uniform distribution 
at 1% significance level (e.g. Figures 4 and 5 for Affari Tuoi). Thus, there is no apparent 
reason for misconceptions that large prizes are more likely to be inside particular boxes.   
[INSERT FIGURES 4 AND 5 HERE] 
                                                 
10 French episodes were recorded by Professor Anabela Botelho who generously shared the data with us.  
11 Italian episodes were recorded by the authors. 
12 A significant portion of British data was compiled from http://donduk.blogspot.com/2006/06/previous-
game-reports.html and related Internet sources. We have also watched several episodes, available online, 
including the Hall of Fame editions of the show with Deal or No Deal UK highlights. We are particularly 
grateful to Dave Woollin for collecting show statistics and publishing it on http://www.screwthebanker.com 
and to Morten Lau for providing information on personal characteristics of contestants. 
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4. Theoretical Prediction  
Expected utility theory and many generalized non-expected utility theories such 
as, for example, regret theory predict that an individual is exactly indifferent between 
keeping her own box and exchanging it for any of the remaining identical sealed boxes. 
However, (cumulative) prospect theory predicts that an individual should always reject 
the exchange offer due to the assumption of loss aversion. First, we will derive these 
theoretical predictions for a static decision problem when contestants evaluate a risky 
lottery as a lottery that delivers each of the possible prizes (that have not yet been 
eliminated from the game) with equal probability. Then we will consider a dynamic case, 
when contestants evaluate a risky lottery taking into account the expectation of future 
“bank” offers that they will receive in the course of the game.  
4.1. Static Decision Problem 
4.1.1. Expected Utility Theory 
According to expected utility theory, an individual should be exactly indifferent 
between keeping her box and exchanging it for any of the remaining sealed boxes. 
Consider a contestant who is offered an exchange when there are N sealed boxes each 
containing one of the prizes Nxxx <<< ...21  . If an individual keeps her box, she obtains 
expected utility ( )∑ = +Ni ixwuN 11 , where ( ).u  is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function of the contestant and w  is her private wealth.  
If the contestant exchanges her box that contains prize ix , { }Ni ,...,1∈ , for one of 
the remaining sealed boxes, she obtains expected utility ( )j
ij
N
j
xwu
N
+− ≠=∑ 11
1 . The 
contestant does not know the content of her box and any prize Nxx ,...,1  is equally likely 
  11
to be inside her box. Therefore, after exchanging the boxes, the contestant receives 
expected utility ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )=+−+−=+− ∑ ∑∑ ∑ = == ≠= Ni iNj jNi jijNj xwuxwuNNxwuNN 1 11 1 11111  
( )∑ = += Ni ixwuN 11 . Thus, the contestant receives exactly the same expected utility after 
exchanging her box as after keeping her initial box. In other words, according to expected 
utility theory there is no reason why the contestant should accept or reject an offer to 
exchange her box for one of the remaining sealed boxes. 
4.1.2. Regret Theory 
Many generalized non-expected utility theories also predict that an individual is 
indifferent between accepting and rejecting swap offer. For example, according to regret 
theory an individual always accepts exchange offer if ( ) ( ) 0,11 1 1 >− ∑ ∑= ≠=
N
i ji
ij
N
j
xx
NN
ψ , 
where ( )⋅⋅,ψ  is a skew-symmetric utility function i.e. ( ) ( )ijji xxxx ,, ψψ −=  (e.g. Loomes 
and Sugden, 1987). It is easy to see that ( ) ( )+= ∑ ∑∑ ∑ = −==
≠
=
N
i ji
i
j
N
i ji
ij
N
j
xxxx
2
1
11 1
,, ψψ  
( ) ( ) ( ) 0,,,
1
1
12
1
1
1
1 1
=−=+ ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑ ∑ += −== −=−= += N ij ijNiNi jiijNi jiN ij xxxxxx ψψψ . Thus, according 
to regret theory a contestant is exactly indifferent between accepting and rejecting the 
exchange offer. The intuition behind this result is simple. A contestant who accepts the 
exchange offer experiences ex post regret when she discovers at the end of the show that 
her initial box contained a larger prize. However, a contestant who rejects the exchange 
offer experiences exactly the same ex post regret when she opens all boxes only to 
discover that her initial box contains a smaller prize than one of the boxes that she could 
have selected when the bank offered an exchange. 
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4.1.3. (Cumulative) Prospect Theory 
In prospect theory, an individual derives utility from changes in her asset position 
relative to a reference point (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). Prospect theory does 
not specify what constitutes a reference point in a particular decision problem. In this 
section we show that an individual should never exchange her own box for any of the 
remaining sealed boxes irrespective of the location of a reference point. This theoretical 
prediction is driven by the assumption of loss aversion.  
A contestant who rejects the exchange offer and keeps her box derives zero utility 
since her asset position does not change (relative to any reference point). Now consider a 
contestant who accepts the exchange offer. Let w  be her private wealth (excluding the 
content of her box) and let ix , { }Ni ,...,1∈ , denote a prize inside her box before exchange. 
Let ( ).v  be the value function that measures utility from changes in wealth relative to a 
reference point. The value function is normalized so that ( ) 00 =v . Prospect theory 
assumes that individuals are loss averse so that the value function is steeper for losses 
than for gains i.e. ( ) ( )xvxv −−<  for any 0>x  (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). 
Although prospect theory does not specify the location of a reference point, it 
assumes that individuals incorporate their initial endowments into their reference point 
(e.g. Kahneman et al. (1991), Tversky and Kahneman (1991)).13 Thus, in the context of 
this natural experiment, we can write a reference point as ixr + , where r  is constant. 
Notice that wr =  is a special case corresponding to the original version of prospect 
                                                 
13 Notice that if a contestant swaps boxes due to her subjective belief that her initial box contains a low 
prize, she may be expected to open an old box immediately after exchange. Interestingly, 90% of 
contestants who accepted the exchange offer in the Italian version of Deal or No Deal, do not open their old 
box immediately after exchange. Contestants, who accepted the first exchange offer opened on average 5.6 
boxes before they called their old box to be opened. This may suggest that Italian contestants developed a 
sense of ownership and incorporated the content of their initial endowment into their reference point.  
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theory in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) where a reference point is assumed to be equal 
to a current asset position. A recently proposed model of Koszegi and Rabin (2006) 
corresponds to a special case when constant r  equals to the private wealth of a contestant 
w  plus her (unobservable) rational expectation of future earnings in Deal or No Deal. In 
the remainder of the paper we will assume that wr ≥ . 
According to the cumulative prospect theory, a contestant who exchanges her own 
box with prize ix  for a box with a lower prize jx , { }1,...,1 −∈ ij  obtains utility 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]ijijij ij xrxwwxrxwwxrxwv −−+<−−−+≤⋅−−+ −−−=∑ δδ PrPr11 , where 
[ ] [ ]1,01,0: →−w  is the probability weighting function for losses (Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992)) and ( )ij xrxw −−+<δPr  denotes the probability that the change in wealth δ  
during the swap of boxes (relative to a reference point ixr + ) is lower than ij xrxw −−+ . 
Finally, according to the cumulative prospect theory, a contestant who exchanges 
her own box with prize ix  for a box with a higher prize jx , { }Nij ,...,1+∈  obtains utility 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]ijijN ij ij xrxwwxrxwwxrxwv −−+>−−−+≥⋅−−+ +++=∑ δδ PrPr1 , where 
[ ] [ ]1,01,0: →+w  is the probability weighting function for gains. The contestant does not 
know the prize ix  sealed inside her box but she knows that each prize Nxx ,...,1  is likely 
to be inside her box. Effectively, she has a stochastic reference point, and her ex ante 
utility from exchanging the boxes is given by 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]∑ ∑= −−−= +−−+<−−−+≤⋅−−+= Ni ijijij ij xrxwwxrxwwxrxwvU 1 11 PrPr δδ  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]∑ ∑= +++= −−+>−−−+≥⋅−−++ Ni ijijN ij ij xrxwwxrxwwxrxwv1 1 PrPr δδ  or, 
equivalently, by 
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(1)
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]{
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]} PrPr                     
PrPr
1
1
1
wrxxwwrxxwwrxxv
rwxxwrwxxwrwxxvU
jijiji
N
i
i
j ijijij
−+−>−−+−≥⋅−+−+
+−+−<−−+−≤⋅−+−=
++
=
−
= −−∑ ∑
δδ
δδ
 
Since all prizes are randomly distributed across the boxes, when two boxes are 
exchanged, every positive change in wealth is equally likely as a negative change in 
wealth of the same absolute amount (relative to the same reference point). In other words, 
( ) ( )rwxxwrxx ijji −+−≤=−+−≥ δδ PrPr  and ( ) ( )rwxxwrxx ijji −+−<=−+−> δδ PrPr  
for every ji xx >  and wr ≥ . The assumption of loss aversion additionally implies that 
( ) ( )rwxxvwrxxv ijji −+−−<−+−  for every ji xx >  and wr ≥ . Using these two 
results we can rewrite equation (1) as an inequality 
(2)   
( ) ( )( )[ ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )]rwxxwrwxxw
rwxxwrwxxwrwxxvU
ijij
ijij
N
i
i
j ij
−+−<+−+−≤−
−−+−<−−+−≤⋅−+−<
++
−−=
−
=∑ ∑
δδ
δδ
PrPr                                                
PrPr
1
1
1   
Previous experimental studies demonstrate that the probability weighting function 
typically has a similar shape for gains and losses but it is more curved for gains and more 
linear for losses (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Abdellaoui (2000)). We will 
assume that there exist probability 21≤q  such that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )pwpwpwpw −−++ −+≥−+ εε  for any [ ]qpp ,0, ∈+ ε  and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )pwpwpwpw −−++ −+≤−+ εε  for any [ ]1,, qpp ∈+ ε . Inequality (2) then 
immediately implies that 0<U  i.e. the contestant derives a strictly negative utility from 
exchanging her box for one of the remaining sealed boxes. In other words, according to 
prospect theory an individual has a strong reason not to exchange her box: the value of 
exchange is strictly negative because a loss averse individual expects more aggravation 
from losses than the pleasure from gains of the same amount. 
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4.2. Dynamic Decision Problem 
In a dynamic decision problem, contestants take into account future “bank” offers 
that they are likely to receive in course of the game. A contestant facing prizes 1x  and 2x  
hidden in two unopened boxes perceives them as a risky lottery ( )21,;21, 21 xxL  just as 
in a static decision problem.14 The contestant facing prizes { }Nxx ,...,1=x  hidden in 
2>N  unopened boxes perceives them as a risky lottery ( )xL . Let m  denote the number 
of boxes that the contestant has to open before the next “bank” offer is made ( m  is either 
2 or 3 in the French version, m  is either 1 or 3 in the Italian version and 3=m  in the 
British version of Deal or No Deal). There are ( )( )!!! mNmNC N mN −=−  combinations of 
prizes x  that the contestant can face when the next offer is made. Let us denote these 
combinations by N
mNC1
xx
−
,..., . Lottery ( )xL  is then recursively defined by  
(3) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )[ ] ( )∑ ∑− −
= =−
−
−
− +<+≥−=
N
mN
N
mNC
i
C
i
iN
mN
mN
iiiiiiN
mN
mN L
C
OuLuIOOuLuIL
C
L
1 1
,
ˆˆˆˆˆ1 xxxxxxxx
ππ
 
where  ( )iO xˆ  is the expectation of a future monetary offer for ix  prizes left in the 
unopened boxes, mN−πˆ  is the expected probability that the “bank” offers an exchange 
option instead of a monetary amount at the stage when mN −  boxes remain unopened 
and ( )xI  is an indicator function i.e. ( ) 1=xI  if x is true and ( ) 0=xI  if x is false.15 For 
the sake of our argument, an anticipated future offer ( )iO xˆ  can be either a probability 
distribution over possible monetary amounts or a monetary amount for certain. 
                                                 
14 In French, Italian and British versions of Deal or No Deal the “bank” does not make any further 
monetary offers when a monetary offer for two prizes is rejected. Thus, in this case dynamic and static 
decision problems coincide because there are no anticipated “bank” offers in the future.  
15 For any two lotteries ( )kk pypyL ,;...;, 111  and ( )ll qzqzL ,;...;, 112  a compound lottery ( ) 21 1 LL αα −+ , [ ]1,0∈α , is defined in the usual way—it yields outcome iy  with probability ip⋅α , { }ki ,...,1∈ , and outcome jz  with probability ( ) jq⋅−α1 , { }lj ,...,1∈ . 
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4.2.1. Expected Utility Theory 
Consider a contestant who is offered an exchange when there are N sealed boxes 
with remaining prizes { }Nxx ,...,1=x . If 2=N , this contestant obtains expected utility 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 22 21 xwuxwuLu +++=x  from rejecting the exchange offer. If 2>N , utility 
from rejecting the swap offer can be calculated through a Bellman optimality equation 
(4)         ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ } ( )( )[ ]∑−
=
−−
−
+−=
N
mNC
i
imNiimNN
mN
LuOuLu
C
Lu
1
ˆˆ,maxˆ11 xxxx ππ . 
Now consider the case when the contestant exchanges her old box for the new box 
with prize { }Njx j ,...,1, ∈  sealed inside. If 2=N , this contestant obtains expected utility 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 22 21 xwuxwuLu +++=x  after accepting the exchange offer. If 2>N , there 
are ( ) ( )( ) NCmNmNC N mNN mN −− −− =−−−= !1!!111  combinations of prizes x , all of which 
include prize jx , that the contestant can face when the next offer is made. Let us denote 
these combinations by 
jj x
x NC1 N mN
xx
−
,..., . Utility from accepting the exchange offer 
(conditional on the prize jx  being inside the new box) is then given by Bellman equation 
(5) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ } ( )( )[ ]∑−
=
−−
−
+−=
NC
i
ximNxiximNN
mN
x
N
mN
jjjj
LuOuLu
C
NLu
1
ˆˆ,maxˆ1 xxxx ππ  
Since the contestant does not know which prize is sealed inside her new box and 
prizes are distributed across boxes at random, expected utility after accepting exchange is 
given by ( )( )∑ =Nj x jLuN 11 x , where conditional expected utility ( )( )jxLu x  is defined in (5). 
Notice that { }N
mN
N
mN C1NC1
xxxx
−−
=⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
= ,...,,...,1UNj xx jj  and expected utility after accepting 
exchange offer can be re-written as (4). Thus, in a dynamic decision problem expected 
utility maximizer gets the same utility from accepting and from rejecting exchange offer. 
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4.2.2. (Cumulative) Prospect Theory 
In a dynamic decision problem, similarly to a static decision problem, contestants 
obtain zero utility from rejecting the exchange offer because their asset position does not 
change relative to any reference point that they may adopt. Next we show that contestants 
receive a strictly negative utility from accepting the exchange offer. If there are only two 
unopened boxes left with prizes 1x  and 2x  sealed inside, a contestant, who accepts the 
exchange offer, derives utility ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) <−−++−−+ +− 2121 1221 wxrxwvwxrxwv  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 021212121 121212 ≤−−−+≤−−++−−+−< −++− wwxwxrvwxrxwvwxwxrv , 
with the first (strict) inequality due to the assumption of loss aversion.  
If there are 2>N  unopened boxes left, a contestant faces a lottery recursively 
defined by (3). Notice that we cannot write Bellman equation (4) because (cumulative) 
prospect theory does not satisfy the independence axiom of expected utility theory. Let 
( )MM qzpzL ,;...;, 11  denote the reduced form of a compound lottery, which is recursively 
defined in (3). According to (cumulative) prospect theory, utility of this lottery is given by 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]∑ ∑= −− +−−+<−−−+≤= ⋅−−+=
<
N
i ijij
M
ij xrzwwxrzwwj xrzwvU
ixjz
1
PrPr1 δδ
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]∑ ∑= ++ −−+>−−−+≥= ⋅−−++
>
N
i ijij
M
ij xrzwwxrzwwj xrzwv
ixjz
1
PrPr1 δδ . 
If prizes are distributed across boxes at random and contestants’ expectation of 
future monetary offers depends only on the set of possible prizes,16 every positive change 
in wealth during the swap is equally likely as a negative change in wealth of the same 
absolute amount (relative to the same reference point). Following the derivation presented 
in section 4.1.3 we can easily show that 0<U  due to the assumption of loss aversion. 
                                                 
16 Deck et al. (2006), Post et al. (2008) and Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2008, 2009) all report that “bank” 
monetary offers depend only on the distribution of possible prizes (in particular, the expected value of 
possible prizes). Bombardini and Trabbi (2005) also find strong correlation between the expected value of 
possible prizes and “bank” monetary offers. 
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5. Results 
Tables 2 and 3 show the decisions of contestants on the first (or the only) exchange 
offer and the second exchange offer respectively. The second swap opportunity is offered 
only in French and Italian versions of Deal or No Deal. It is accepted in 45% of cases in 
the French version and in 36% of cases—in the Italian version. Observed decisions are 
quite similar across all three versions even through French contestants typically receive 
several swap offers, Italian contestants are guaranteed to get at least one exchange 
opportunity and only one fifth of British contestants are given the chance to swap boxes. 
High percentage of contestants, who accept the exchange offer and do not keep 
their initial endowment, shows that contestants exhibit rather weak endowment effects. 
Contestants who accept at least one exchange offer do not reveal endowment effects. 
Contestants who rejected all swap offers do not necessarily exhibit an endowment effect. 
Thus, contestants, who accept the first (or the only) exchange offer, and contestants, who 
reject the first offer but accept the second offer, are not averse to losses. 73% of French 
contestants, 47% of Italian contestants and 43% of British contestants, who receive the 
exchange offer in our data set, clearly reveal no endowment effect.17  
Decision on the first (or 
the only) exchange offer 
Number (percentage) of episodes 
French version Italian version British version 
Accept 19 (46%) 40 (40%) 27 (43%) 
Reject 22 (54%) 60 (60%) 36 (57%) 
Table 2 Decisions of contestants on the first (or only) exchange offer 
Decision on the first  
exchange offer 
Decision on the second 
exchange offer 
Number (percentage) of episodes 
French version Italian version 
Accept 
Accept 1 (4%) 3 (11%) 
Reject 12 (44%) 8 (28%) 
Reject 
Accept 11 (41%) 7 (25%) 
Reject 3 (11%) 10 (36%) 
Table 3 Decisions of contestants on the second exchange offer 
                                                 
17 In the French (Italian) version of Deal or No Deal, 19 (40) contestants accept the first offer and 11 (7) 
contestants reject the first offer but accept the second offer. Thus, 30 out of 41 French contestants (73%) 
and 47 out of 100 Italian contestants (47%), who receive the swap offer, accept at least one exchange offer.  
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Expected utility theory and many non-expected utility theories (e.g. regret theory) 
predict that an individual is exactly indifferent between accepting and rejecting the swap. 
The chi-squared statistics for the null hypothesis that contestants accept the exchange 
offer with probability 50% are χ2=0.286 (p=0.593), χ2=2.722 (p=0.099) and χ2=1.286 
(p=0.257) correspondingly for French, Italian and British contestants, who received only 
one exchange offer. Thus, these contestants appear to be largely indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting the swap. However, in all three versions a higher proportion of 
contestants reject the swap offer. This is consistent with certain degree of “stickiness” 
that Friedman (1998) finds in the Monty Hall problem and with the “reluctance to 
switch” that Charness and Levin (2005) observe in a simple Bayesian updating game. 
For contestants who received two exchange offers, the chi-squared statistics are 
χ2=13.741 (p=0.003) and χ2 = 3.714 (p=0.294) correspondingly in the French and Italian 
version. Thus, the hypothesis that these contestants are equally likely to accept or reject 
the swap cannot be rejected in the Italian data set but it is rejected at 1% significance 
level in the French data set. To shed more light on this finding, consider the decisions of 
19 French contestants, who received three exchange offers (Table 4). The frequency of 
these decisions is significantly different from a uniform distribution (χ2=21.842, p=0.003). 
First exchange Accept Reject 
Second exchange Accept Reject Accept Reject 
Third exchange Accept Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject
Number (%) of 
episodes 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
3 
(16%)
4 
(21%)
2 
(10.5%)
8 
(42%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(10.5%)
Table 4 Decisions of French contestants on the third exchange offer 
An inspection of Tables 3 and 4 reveals that Deal or No Deal contestants tend to 
accept one exchange offer but they are reluctant to swap boxes several times even if the 
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exchange opportunity is persistently repeated.18 Thus, multiple exchange opportunities 
increase the number of contestants who swap boxes once (in violation of the endowment 
effect). However, multiple exchange opportunities cause no sizable increase in the 
number of contestants who swap boxes more than once (in violation of the assumption 
that contestants are equally likely to accept and to reject the exchange offer). 
Approximately every second contestant, who receives the exchange offer, swaps 
the boxes at least once. Thus, observed endowment effects are weaker in our recorded 
sample compared to typical findings in the laboratory experiments. However, if 
preferences or decision making rules are heterogeneous, our results may suggest that 
while most contestants are indifferent to accepting the exchange offer, some of them 
exhibit endowment effects. Another possibility could be that people are generally loss 
averse when boxes contain large prizes, but they are largely indifferent between accepting 
and rejecting the swap if large prizes are eliminated from the game. To investigate these 
hypotheses, we regress exchange decisions on lottery-specific (expected value, median 
and standard deviation of possible prizes etc.) and individual-specific variables (gender, 
age and marital status). Maximum likelihood logit coefficient estimates (and standard 
errors) are reported in Table 5.  
Table 5 shows that exchange decisions do not depend on the distribution of 
possible monetary prizes that contestants face when the “bank” offers a swap opportunity. 
Contestants, who eliminated large prizes, do not appear to be significantly more likely to 
accept or reject the exchange offer compared to contestants, who eliminated small prizes. 
Similarly, contestants’ decision to accept the exchange offer is apparently not affected by 
expected value, median or standard deviation of prizes that are left in unopened boxes. 
                                                 
18 Our sample also includes four French contestants who received four exchange offers during the game. 
Among these contestants, one contestant rejected all four offers, two contestants accepted one exchange 
offer and the remaining contestant swapped boxes twice. 
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Table 5 also shows no evidence of exchange decisions being correlated with 
individual-specific variables (only in the Italian version of Deal or No Deal female and 
older contestants are marginally less likely to accept a swap offer). Overall, none of 
lottery-specific or individual-specific variables has a significant explanatory power for 
predicting the decisions to accept the exchange offer.19 Such decisions appear to be quite 
random and spontaneous, perhaps indicating that contestants are indeed largely 
indifferent between accepting and rejecting the swap offer. 
Explanatory variables French version Italian version British version
Constant 5.7326 (4.4159) 
0.3027 
(2.1527) 
4.2688 
(2.6896) 
Natural logarithm of expected value 
of possible prizes 
-0.7766 
(1.2433) 
0.1300 
(1.0588) 
0.7133 
(1.4368) 
Natural logarithm of a median 
possible prize 
-0.0635 
(0.1845) 
0.0827 
(0.1636) 
0.3959 
(0.6906) 
Natural logarithm of a standard 
deviation of possible prizes 
0.4124 
(1.1894) 
0.0078 
(0.9682) 
-1.2981 
(0.9610) 
Number of “large” prizes left in the 
list of possible prizes20 
-0.1145 
(0.1294) 
-0.0919 
(0.1421) 
0.2114 
(0.3353) 
Gender dummy (0 for male, 1 for 
female) 
-0.2466 
(0.5656) 
-0.7332 
(0.3937) 
-0.7499 
(0.6000) 
Self-reported age or an estimate based 
on a physical appearance (in years) 
-0.0048 
(0.0516) 
-0.0297 
(0.0169) 
-0.0255 
(0.0247) 
Marital status (1 for married, 2 for 
single, 3 for divorced, 4 for widowed)
-0.2628 
(0.4820) 
-0.4354 
(0.3286) 
-1.1338 
(0.9728) 
Dummy variable (=1 if a contestant 
already accepted an earlier swap offer)
-1.6023 
(0.6282) 
-0.5723 
(0.8508) - 
Number of observations N 91 129 63 
Log-likelihood -55.0224 -81.5361 -37.4887 
McFadden’s likelihood ratio index 0.1277 0.0881 0.1415 
Veall and Zimmermann R2 0.2589 0.1874 0.2823 
Table 5 Estimated coefficients (standard errors) in a logit regression of exchange 
decisions (dependant variable is 1 if contestant swaps boxes and 0 otherwise) 
                                                 
19 The only variable that is statistically significant (in the French version of Deal or No Deal) is a dummy 
variable indicating whether a contestant already accepted a swap offer earlier in the course of the show. 
20 “Large” prizes are defined as prizes that appear on the right-hand side of a television screen. In French 
version “large” prizes are prizes greater than €5000, in Italian version—greater than €500 and in British 
version—greater than £750. 
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6. Conclusion 
Television show Deal or No Deal offers a unique opportunity to study individual 
decision making under risk using lotteries with outcomes as high as half a million euros. 
Perhaps for the first time since the famous thought experiment of Maurice Allais, we can 
investigate choice between large-stake lotteries with real incentives and real people. 
Contestants from various regions of France, Italy and United Kingdom are widely 
dispersed in terms of age and occupation, which makes them a more diversified subject 
pool compared to the undergraduate students in the conventional laboratory experiments.  
Deal or No Deal contestants are endowed with a sealed box containing unknown 
monetary prize (drawn from a known uniform distribution). In French, Italian and British 
versions of Deal or No Deal, contestants can exchange their initial endowment for an 
identical box with another prize drawn from the same uniform distribution. We find that 
73% of French contestants, 47% of Italian contestants and 43% of British contestants, 
who receive the possibility to swap their box, accept the exchange offer at least once. 
Thus, Deal or No Deal contestants reveal weaker endowment effects compared to typical 
findings in the laboratory experiments. These results suggest that even inexperienced 
individuals may overcome endowment effect when facing unusual decision problem 
involving substantial monetary rewards. 
Exchange decisions are not correlated with lottery-specific variables such as the 
expected value of possible prizes. Contestants, who eliminated large prizes from the list 
of possible prizes, do not appear to be more likely to accept or reject the exchange offer. 
We also find that exchange decisions are not correlated with individual-specific variables, 
with the exception of Italian female and older contestants, who are marginally less likely 
to accept the exchange offer. Thus, if there are individual differences in the strength of 
endowment effects, they appear to be largely an unobserved heterogeneity. 
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In traditional laboratory studies of endowment effects (e.g. Plott and Zeiler (2007), 
List(2004), Knetsch (1989)) subjects are endowed with physical goods of a similar value. 
In contrast, Deal or No Deal contestants receive uncertain endowments. The use of risky 
lotteries as the objects of exchange is a promising avenue for studying endowment effects 
when stakes are as high as half a million Euros. Commodities that have similar high value 
(e.g. real estate properties, Monet paintings from the same series etc.) are never exactly 
identical with many small inconsequential differences (e.g. a view from the window).  
An experimenter can hardly control for such differences that may be just sufficient 
for inducing a strict preference for one of the objects. However, an experimenter can 
always construct identical risky lotteries over cash prizes or physical goods. Laboratory 
studies show that the effects of loss aversion are just as strong in choice under risk as they 
are in a riskless choice (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1992)). Thus, the research on the 
loss aversion and the endowment effect can benefit from further laboratory experiments 
on the exchange asymmetries when the objects of exchange are identical risky lotteries. 
If contestants incorporate the (initially unknown) content of the box that they 
select for themselves at the beginning of the show into their reference point, loss aversion 
predicts that contestants should always reject a swap offer. This is a stronger implication 
of loss aversion than in the mug-candy bar exchange experiments (Knetsch and Sinden 
(1984), Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) and Knetsch (1989)). In these experiments 
loss aversion implies that the fraction of individuals, who are not willing to exchange a 
mug (candy bar) for a candy bar (mug), should be higher in the treatment where subjects 
were initially endowed with a mug (candy bar) compared to the fraction of subjects in the 
baseline treatment, who were endowed with nothing and subsequently choose a mug 
(candy bar). Such control treatment is not required in our natural experiment because two 
objects that may be exchanged yield identical distributions of cash prizes. 
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Figure 1 Screenshot with a List of Possible Prizes in the French 
version of Deal or No Deal 
 
 
Figure 2 Screenshot with a List of Possible Prizes in the Italian 
version of Deal or No Deal 
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Figure 3 Screenshot with a List of Possible Prizes in the British 
version of Deal or No Deal 
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Figure 4 The Distribution of Prizes from 0.01 to 500 Euros Across Twenty Boxes  
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Figure 5 The Distribution of Prizes from 5,000 to 500,000 Euros Across Twenty Boxes 
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